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AND THEN ALONG CAME JOHN: FEDERAL
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN
CONTRAVENTION OF STATE LAW VIOLATES
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, the Supreme Court restored the Commerce Clause to
the curriculum of every law school in the nation by invalidating the
Gun-Free School Zones Act' in United States v. Lopez.2 The Court
held Congress had gone too far in passing legislation that provided
stiff penalties for possessing a gun while in a school zone.3 Lopez
signaled the Court's shift away from a deferential stance to Congress
and towards a more suspicious view of federal intrusion on matters
of local control. Many figured Lopez was simply a blip on the
Supreme Court's radar screen until the Court again invalidated a
federal regulation as too attenuated to Congress's Commerce Clause
powers in United States v. Morrison.4 Since Lopez and Morrison,
Congress has had to tread more cautiously when passing legislation
pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers-powers that from 1937
until 1995 had seen virtually no challenge.5
There are numerous areas of legislation traditionally reserved to
the states under their general police power. Probably the most well-
known of these areas are criminal law enforcement,
6 education,7
health and safety,8 and family law.9 This list, however, is illustrative
1. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (2000).
2. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3. See id. at 567-68.
4. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
5. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 606-07.
6. See id. at 549.
7. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
8. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
719(1985).
9. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
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and far from exhaustive. The tension between state police power and
federal control rears its head in numerous contexts.
Three contexts in which this tension arises are the general state
police power, the preemption doctrine, and state immunity to suit in
federal court. The first context reflects a common sentiment in
federalism jurisprudence that some areas of regulations are simply
better left to state control. The Lopez court felt that giving Congress
the power to regulate firearms possession near schools was too much
of an intrusion on the police power of the state.' 0 The Court in
Morrison held the Violence Against Women Act 1 unconstitutional
because it allowed the federal government to regulate gender-
motivated crime. The Court stated it could not think of a "better
example of the police power, which the Founders denied the
National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression
of violent crime... ,,12
Preemption doctrine supplies a second example of federalism at
work. Specifically relevant to this Note is the judicial assumption of
nonpreemption, where courts presume federal law does not preempt
state law to the contrary when there has been a lack of a federal
presence in that area.' 3 This assumption illustrates the judiciary's
skepticism towards attempts by the federal government to supercede
existing state law absent a history of federal regulation in that area.
A third context in which federalism concerns often arise is when
a state claims immunity to suit in federal court absent specific
congressional intent to abrogate this immunity.14 In recent years, the
Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to expand the immunity
of states to suit in federal1 5 and, in some cases, state court.' 6
The Court has thus supplied many foundations of federalism.
For example, regulation of certain matters is best left to local control.
Also, a state is not subject to suit in federal court unless Congress
expressly abrogates its immunity through its Fourteenth Amendment,
10. See id. at 567-68.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
12. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
13. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451-56
(1976).
15. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
16. See id. at 793 n.29.
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Section Five powers. 17 Finally, courts presume federal law does not
preempt state law to the contrary when no history of federal
regulation in the area exists.
With these three admittedly general concepts of federalism in
the background, this Note considers a more specific illustration of
the tension between federal and state power. Suppose a federal
statute exists that Congress passed pursuant to its Commerce Clause
powers. Assume further that a federal executive official has the
power to interpret this statute. Although this statute regulates a
broad class of interstate activity, this executive interprets the federal
statute in a manner that contravenes existing state law. Finally and
most crucially, assume the activity in question, when viewed strictly
at the state level, is an activity where regulation has traditionally
been reserved to the States under their general police power.
This situation parallels the current battle between Attorney
General John Ashcroft and the state of Oregon. Although addressed
at length later in this Note,' 8 it suffices to say that in the case of
Oregon v. Ashcroft, Ashcroft interpreted a federal law-the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA)-in a manner that invalidated
Oregon's physician assisted suicide law. A District Court found
Ashcroft lacked the statutory authority to interpret the CSA, and thus
enjoined Ashcroft from enforcing his interpretation of the CSA.
Assuming arguendo that Ashcroft has the statutory authority to
interpret the CSA as he sees fit, this Note proposes his interpretation
violates principles of federalism.
If one accepts the principles of federalism above, that certain
areas are better left to state control, that courts require express
congressional intent to abrogate state immunity to suit in federal
court, and that courts apply federal preemption warily, it follows that
a federal official should not be able to interpret federal law in a
manner that infringes on a state's power to regulate in an arena
traditionally reserved to the state. In addition, consistent with the
Court's approach in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,19 the court should require
the federal statute to contain express congressional intent to abrogate
state regulation in the area in question. This principle would prevent
federal officials from overriding a contravening state practice when
17. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
18. See infra Part II.
19. 427 U.S. at 445.
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the state has traditionally regulated that area. Without such a
principle federal officials are free to interpret federal law in a manner
that contravenes existing state policy and thus runs afoul of
federalism concerns.
This is not to say that any time a federal law conflicts with a
state law there needs to be express congressional intent to override
the state's legislation. Such a principle would undermine the
doctrine of field preemption.20 Rather, this Note proposes that when
the area affected is an area traditionally within a state's police power,
the Court should require a showing of express intent before allowing
a federal official to interpret federal law in this contravening manner.
Part II of this Note addresses the backdrop to this discussion and
provides the reader with an overview of principles of federalism
(specifically, the concepts of state police power, the assumption of
nonpreemption, and state sovereign immunity) and a discussion of
case law and scholarship in support of this proposal. Part III applies
this proposal to the ongoing battle between Attorney General
Ashcroft and the state of Oregon over the validity of Oregon's Death
with Dignity Act, which is a timely example of a federal official
interpreting a federal statute in contravention of existing state law.
Part IV concludes that absent a showing of specific
congressional intent, a federal official should not be able to interpret
a federal statute in a manner that contravenes existing state law when
the area of regulation is one traditionally reserved to the states. This
Note concludes that Ashcroft's actions do not pass Constitutional
muster and represent a dramatic attempt to increase the power of the
executive at the expense of the states. Courts must adopt principles
that prevent such a usurpation of power by the Executive from the
states. This Note provides one possible method: a requirement of
express congressional intent before such an interpretation can take
effect.
II. DISCUSSION: PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM
Although it is difficult to describe broad principles of federalism
adequately in such limited space, the reader must grasp the following
three principles of federalism in order to accept this Note's proposal:
20. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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1) the states' general police power, 2) preemption doctrine, and 3)
state immunity to suit in federal court.
A. First Principles: John Marshall and Cohens v. Virginia
Before delving into principles of federalism and an extensive
discussion of Oregon v. Ashcroft, it is helpful to note the comments
of Chief Justice John Marshall, the father of first principles of federal
power. Writing for the Court in Cohens v. Virginia, Marshall
observed that:
To interfere with the penal laws of a State, where they are
not levelled against the legitimate powers of the Union, but
have for their sole object the internal government of the
country, is a very serious measure, which Congress cannot
be supposed to adopt lightly, or inconsiderately. The
motives for it must be serious and weighty. It would be
taken deliberately, and the intention would be clearly and
unequivocally expressed.
An act, such as that under consideration, ought not, we
think, to be so construed as to imply this intention, unless
its provisions were such as to render the construction
inevitable. 1
Marshall was only willing to allow Congress to intrude on areas
of state sovereignty if the act by which it sought to legislate
inevitably resulted in an intrusion on state sovereignty. In Cohens,
Congress enacted a gaming law that applied only to the District of
Columbia. The Court found Congress intended the gaming statute to
be local legislation and, therefore, the law had no preemptive effect
on state statutes.
22
Similarly, Congress did not enact the CSA with the inevitable
construction in mind that the CSA would preempt all contrary state
legislation.23 It is doubtful that states would even have an equivalent
of the CSA, since the CSA addresses interstate drug trafficking,
which is necessarily the province of the federal Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), not the individual states.
21. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,443 (1821).
22. See id. at 441-46.
23. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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Marshall noted that in certain, limited circumstances the federal
government may pass laws that appear to exercise the police power.
In Cohens, Marshall stated, "Congress has a right to punish murder
in a fort, or other place within its exclusive jurisdiction; but no
general right to punish murder committed within any of the States. 24
Here, Cohens provides a final statement of further support to the
proposal that a federal official, absent a clear congressional
statement, may not interpret federal law in a manner that contravenes
existing state law in an area traditionally reserved to the states
because of the intrusion on state plenary power. With the
admonition of Chief Justice Marshall and a brief overview of Oregon
v. Ashcroft in hand, this Note turns to a discussion of principles of
federalism.
B. The Police Power
While the federal government is a government of limited,
enumerated powers, the states have general police power to regulate
matters of local concern.25 The Founding Fathers realized that many
areas of regulation are better left to local rather than federal control.
Combined with a healthy dose of suspicion of a powerful, centralized
federal government, the framers created a system consisting of a
limited federal government and states with general police power.26
The federal government has traditionally left certain areas of
regulation to the states. Lopez highlighted a few of these areas as
crime, education, and family law.27 As stated above, this list is far
from exhaustive and only serves to highlight a few areas of the
Court's police power jurisprudence over the years.28 Another area of
general police power reserved to the states is health and safety
regulation,29 which specifically includes the direct control of
medicine. Linder v. United States added the direct control of
24. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 426.
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
26. See id.
27. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
28. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, Sec'y of Labor, 426 U.S. 833,
842-44 (1976). While the Court overruled National League of Cities shortly
thereafter, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985),
the notion that certain areas of control are best left to local regulation lives on.
See id. at 546-51.
29. See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 719.
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medicine to the list of general state police powers in 1925 .30 There,
the Supreme Court reversed a doctor's federal conviction for
providing a drug addict with prescription drugs that relieved
conditions related to her addiction.31 This specific example of a
state's general police power becomes important when we consider
this Note's proposal as applied to Oregon's Death with Dignity Act
in Part III.
The Tenth Amendment reflects a compromise among the
Framers. Specifically, certain Framers were afraid that the
Constitution took too much power away from the states and some
Framers feared that it did not take enough.32 This amendment
reflects the sentiment that if a right is neither delegated to the federal
government nor prohibited to the states, then the right falls within the
states' police power.
33
The Linder Court made a strong statement about Congress's
power to regulate the area of prescription medicine, saying:
Congress cannot, under the pretext of executing delegated
power, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not
entrusted to the Federal Government. And we accept as
established doctrine that any provision of an act of
Congress ostensibly enacted under power granted by the
Constitution, not naturally and reasonably adapted to the
effective exercise of such power but solely to the
achievement of something plainly within power reserved to
the States, is invalid and cannot be enforced.34
The Court held the narcotics law at issue was no more than a
revenue raising measure and that the federal prescription law could
not interfere with a doctor's "professional conduct., 35  This
30. See Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925). While Linder may
appear to be a relic of a bygone era, having been decided before the New Deal,
courts have been kind to Linder's characterization of the direct control of
medicine. Hillsborough County notes that "the regulation of health and safety
matters is primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern." Hillsborough
County, 471 U.S. at 719.
31. See Linder, 268 U.S. at 18.
32. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
34. Linder, 268 U.S. at 17.
35. See id. at 23. Granted, the Court has been wary of using the Tenth
Amendment as the main vehicle for protection of states' rights and has opined
that the political process provides the only protection for the state. See Garcia
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statement reflects the Court's general disapproval of congressional
regulation of matters left to the state.
Linder decided the limits of Congress's ability to legislate in an
area traditionally reserved to the states-the prescribing of
medicine.36  It has long been a hallmark of Constitutional
jurisprudence that Congress may not legislate under its enumerated
powers in order to effect the achievement of something within the
power of the states.37 Linder noted that the federal government could
not use a federal revenue raising statute in order to prosecute a doctor
for prescribing opiates to a known drug addict because the statute
was simply a tax statute.38  The importance of Linder for its
description of an area traditionally reserved to state control becomes
important in the consideration of the current stand-off between
Attorney General Ashcroft and the state of Oregon.
The police power doctrine within federalism represents the
strongest argument in favor of the approach this Note proposes. The
states are better suited than the federal government to regulate certain
areas such as the direct control of medicine. Whenever a federal
official threatens to contravene existing state law in a traditionally
state-regulated area, courts should immediately cast a wary eye
towards the federal action and view it as an intrusion on the state
police power.
C. The Assumption of Nonpreemption
As stated earlier, this Note does not propose that a federal
official's interpretation of a federal regulation in contravention of
existing state law necessarily violates the spirit of federalism. Such
an approach would undermine the Supremacy Clause39 and
preemption doctrine. Preemption comes in two flavors: conflict
preemption and field preemption. Conflict preemption refers to
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551-53 (1985). But in the
instant case, Oregon faces an executive interpretation of a federal statute.
Thus, the Tenth Amendment provides the state with protection as the Attorney
General is not subject to the political process.
36. Note that Congress may still regulate interstate trafficking of drugs
pursuant to its Article I, Section Eight powers, and that Linder only imposes a
limit on federal regulation of the direct control (i.e. prescription) of medicine.
37. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
38. See Linder, 268 U.S. at 17.
39. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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situations where "compliance with both federal and state regulations
is a physical impossibility."40 Field preemption refers to a broader
concept of federal supremacy, where the federal regulation in
question is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."
This Note's proposal applies only when an area of regulation
traditionally left to the states is in question. Thus this Note's
proposal reinforces values of federalism by preserving both states'
power to regulate matters of local concern and federal power to
supercede state law. But preemption only applies when such federal
power is a constitutional exercise of federal regulation (or
interpretation, as is the case in this Note's example).
A final element of the preemption doctrine that lends support to
this Note is the Court's observation in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
42Corp. that there is an "assumption" of nonpreemption. The Court
in Rice stated "the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superceded by... [the federal law in question] unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress."43 The Court more recently
has noted that Rice indicates that "an 'assumption' of nonpre-
emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where
there has been a history of significant federal presence." 44  This
assumption of nonpreemption weighs in favor of skeptically viewing
any attempt by a federal official to interpret a law in contravention of
existing state law.
D. State Sovereign Immunity to Suit in Federal Court
The notion that a state should be immune from suit in federal
court has its roots in English law, and it was the subject of much
discussion by the Framers.45 However, codification of this concept
did not occur until the late eighteenth century in response to the case
40. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963).
41. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
45. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It is inherent in
the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent .... [T]he exemption, as one of the attributes of
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union.").
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of Chisholm v. Georgia.46 In Chisholm, the Supreme Court found
that "the Constitution vests a jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over
a State, as a defendant, at the suit of a private citizen of another
State. ' '47  This decision "fell upon the country with a profound
shock, 48 prompting Congress and the states to ratify quickly the
Eleventh Amendment.49
The Court has conceded that the plain text of the Eleventh
Amendment does not directly assert that a state is immune to suit by
its own citizens, but has nonetheless held that federal jurisdiction
over unconsenting states "was not contemplated by the Constitution
when establishing the judicial power of the United States."5 The
Supreme Court has maintained that, absent express congressional
intent, an unconsenting state is immune to suit in federal court,
regardless of the citizenship of the plaintiff.5'
The Supreme Court requires express congressional intent before
Congress may abrogate a state's immunity to suit in federal court.52
Further, the Court has recognized that Congress may only abrogate
state sovereign immunity through its powers under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 53 Both doctrines illustrate a sentiment
among the Court that state sovereignty to suit in federal court is one
of the more hallowed hallmarks of federalism.54 The Court requires
express congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity
because if the federal government were allowed to drag a state into
46. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
47. Id. at 420.
48. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 96 (rev. ed. 1932).
49. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-25 (discussing Chisholm and its wake).
Most notably, the Georgia legislature passed a bill providing that anyone who
attempted to enforce the Chisholm decision would be "guilty of felony and
shall suffer death, without benefit of clergy, by being hanged." DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-
1801 196 (1997).
50. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
51. See id. at 16-18.
52. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 451-56.
53. See id. at 456.
54. But see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 101 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (supporting a more narrow view of state immunity where a state is
only immune to suit in federal court when the plaintiff is a non-citizen).
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federal court, Congress would exercise more power over the state's
affairs than over federal affairs.
This judicially enforced requirement of express congressional
intent represents a particularly striking protection of state
sovereignty. Not only must Congress specifically abrogate state
immunity in these instances, but it may only do so pursuant to its
Fourteenth Amendment, Section Five powers. It is of no small
import that the Court does not allow Congress to abrogate state
immunity to federal suit through its Commerce Clause powers, the
main vehicle of congressional legislation.56 If abrogation under the
Fourteenth Amendment requires an express statement of
congressional intent, then certainly legislating pursuant to the
Commerce Clause is even more judicially suspect. It thus appears
that in this situation, where the Court feels state autonomy is
especially at risk, the Court requires the federal government to justify
its intrusion on state sovereignty more persuasively.
One should not view the Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence in a vacuum and conclude the doctrine is limited solely
to the situation where a state is a non-consenting defendant in federal
court. Rather, the Court's decisions in this arena represent broader
concepts of federalism. If the Court is willing to require such an
exacting method of abrogating state immunity to federal suit, the
Court must feel that subjecting a state to federal jurisdiction is a
serious threat to the balance of power that principles of federalism
are designed to uphold.
Thus, when contravention is in an area traditionally reserved to
the states, the Court should view any attempt by a federal official to
contravene existing state law as a violation of principles of
federalism unless there is a clear expression of congressional intent
to supercede the state's practice. Allowing a federal official to
contradict state law in an arena that falls under the state police power
is at least as much of an intrusion on state sovereignty as it would be
if states were subject to federal court jurisdiction. In order to
ameliorate this situation, courts should uphold such an interpretation
only when Congress has expressly stated its intent to override a
state's intent in passing its own legislation.
55. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 451-52, 455.
56. See id.
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E. Lopez and Morrison: Certain Areas are Better Left to Local
Rather than Federal Control
With the Lopez decision in 1995, the Supreme Court signaled
that Congress could not simply show an attenuated link to interstate
commerce and legislate freely regarding matters that are arguably of
purely local concern. Specifically, it was not for Congress to
legislate regarding the possession of a firearm in a school zone, as
the regulation of crime and education are matters within the police
power of the states.57 The Court dismissed any purported link to
interstate commerce by invalidating the statute as beyond Congress's
power.
58
It appeared that Lopez might have been an aberration and
nothing more than a shot across Congress's bow; a judicial effort to
tell Congress to do a better job of legislative fact-finding before
passing legislation that appeared to exceed its authority. Any such
thoughts vanished when the Court handed down its decision in
Morrison, which was strongly in favor of expansive state police
power.59 The Court, with these two decisions, dramatically shifted
from its post-New Deal reluctance to invalidate federal legislation,
no matter how attenuated its link to Congress's (in these cases,
Commerce Clause) power to make law.
These recent decisions highlight the Court's view that Congress
must keep its nose out of areas within a state's police power.60 Lopez
and Morrison not only stand for a restriction on Congress's
Commerce Clause powers, but also reflect traditional principles of
federalism, such as the concept of general state police power.
F. Linder: Direct Control of Medicine is a Matter of Local Control
Rarely does one find a statement regarding state police power as
blunt as the Court's statement in Linder. There, the Court stated,
"Obviously, direct control of medical practice in the States is beyond
the power of the Federal Government. ' '61  In Linder, a doctor
prescribed morphine and cocaine in order to help a patient with her
57. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57.
58. See id. at 552.
59. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
60. For an excellent overview of the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61. Linder, 268 U.S. at 18.
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drug addiction.62 The doctor prescribed these drugs without a
prescription and was found guilty under a federal narcotics law.
63
The Court reversed the conviction, finding that the federal statute
was "essentially a revenue measure" with the primary purpose of
"enforcing the special tax [on prescription drugs]." 64  The Court
cautioned against further overreaching by Congress near the end of
its opinion, when it stated, "Federal power is delegated, and its
prescribed limits must not be transcended even though the end seem
desirable." 65 Linder's declaration that the direct control of medicine
is an area of regulation reserved to the states has withstood the test of
66time.
G. Courts Must Require Express Congressional Intent Before a
Federal Official May Interpret Federal Law in Contravention of
Existing State Law
Three concepts of federalism are central to the analysis of the
situation involving Attorney General Ashcroft and the state of
Oregon. First, states have general police power to regulate matters
of local concern; the Constitution withholds such a plenary police
power from Congress. 67 This is a hallmark of states' rights and one
of the founding principles of this nation. Second, the assumption of
nonpreemption supports the notion that when all else fails, state law
should govern the regulation of matters of local concern and courts
should not presume federal preemption.68  Third, states enjoy
62. See id. at 11-12.
63. See id. at 15-16.
64. Id. at 22.
65. Id.
66. Concerns of health and safety are matters of local control.
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985).
In Hillsborough County, the Court rejected an argument that a federal statute
preempted a plaintiff from recovering for medical negligence. See id. This is
especially interesting considering the current push to limit punitive damage
awards for medical malpractice: a push occurring at the federal level. See
National Center for Policy Analysis, Medical Malpractice Reform Urgently
Needed, available at http://www.ncpa.org/iss/hea/2003/pd010203b.html (Jan.
2, 2003).
67. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
68. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 ("[C]ongress legislated here in a field which
the States have traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the [f]ederal
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sovereignty to federal intrusion in certain arenas, perhaps most
notably in their being immune to suit in federal court absent consent
or congressional abrogation. 69 Only with an express statement by
Congress abrogating a state's immunity may someone bring suit
against the non-consenting state in federal court.
Case law (especially recently) strongly supports the notion that
certain matters are better left to local control and that state
sovereignty is of paramount importance in these areas. 70 Lopez and
Morrison provide the reader with an overview of what the Court
considers to be examples of federal overreaching. Both of these
cases address Congress's overstepping its Commerce Clause powers
and legislating where states should be legislating. Linder provides a
specific example of an area where the federal government has no
business legislating-the direct control of medicine.
In order to prevent further overreaching by federal lawmakers,
the Court must adopt principles that limit the ability of federal
officials to interpret federal law in a manner that runs contrary to
existing state law. One such vehicle would be to require Congress to
explicitly state in a federal statute that an official may interpret the
law in a manner that would contradict existing state law. This would
avoid the problem that arises when a federal official simply interprets
a federal statute so as to supercede state law. With express
congressional intent behind such an interpretation, the federal official
is no longer usurping the power of the states, rather, the official is
acting pursuant to a valid grant of power from Congress.
Absent such intent, it appears that the federal official is acting
on his own volition and giving little consideration to the federalism
ramifications of his interpretive action. But Congress should be able
to insert its intent to abrogate state sovereignty in statutes if it so
desires. A federal official should only be able to interpret federal
law in contradiction of existing state law when Congress has
specifically granted the official such peremptory power, and the
requirement of express congressional intent is the most efficient
method of allowing such an interpretation while preserving
fundamentals of federalism.
[law] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.") (citations
omitted).
69. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54.
70. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
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With these principles in hand, this Note considers the case of
Oregon v. Ashcroft and the pitched battle between, in the blue corner,
a federal executive's interpretation of a federal statute and, in the red
corner, a state-level ballot initiative.
III. APPLICATION
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act71 has seen a tumultuous ride.
72After a narrowly passed 1994 ballot initiative, a District Court's
determination that the initiative violated the Equal Protection
Clause,73 the Ninth Circuit's vacating that decision,74 and a 1997
vote that decisively reaffirmed the original ballot initiative,75 Oregon
became the first to legalize physician-assisted suicide.
Then, on November 6, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft, in
a memorandum to DEA Administrator Asa Hutchinson (the
"Ashcroft Directive"), declared that "assisting suicide is not a
'legitimate medical purpose' within the meaning of 21 CFR §
1306.04 (2001), and that prescribing, dispensing, or administering
federally controlled substances to assist suicide violates the
Controlled Substances Act.
76
The state of Oregon filed suit two days later and challenged
Ashcroft's "interpretive rule." District Court Judge Robert E. Jones
entered a preliminary injunction on November 20, 2001, and issued a
permanent injunction on April 17, 2002. 77 Judge Jones noted that the
"case turns on the CSA and does not require constitutional
analysis. 78 He concluded that "Congress never intended, through
the CSA or through any other current federal law, to grant blanket
authority to the Attorney General or the DEA to define, as a matter
71. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.995 (1999).
72. Oregon Measure 16 passed by a margin of 51% to 49%. Oregon Blue
Book, Intitiative, Referendum and Recall 1988-1995, available at
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections21 .htm.
73. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995).
74. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).
75. Oregon Measure 51 passed by a margin of 60% to 40%. See Oregon
Blue Book, Intitiative, Referendum and Recall 1996-2000, available at
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections22.htm.
76. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg.
56,607 (Nov. 9, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1306).
77. See Ashcrofl, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1080, 1084 (D. Or. 2002).
78. Id. at 1084.
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of federal policy, what constitutes the legitimate practice of
medicine., 79 The Department of Justice has appealed this decision.
Although Judge Jones' granting of the permanent injunction
turned on a statutory analysis of whether Ashcroft had the authority
to interpret the CSA, this situation presents a compelling
constitutional question: If the Supreme Court requires express
Congressional intent to abrogate state sovereignt, °80 and some
matters of regulation are better left to local control, is Ashcroft's
action consistent with the principles of federalism? The CSA makes
no mention of abrogating existing state law regarding prescription
medicine. Yet Ashcroft's interpretation of the CSA amounts to
"direct control" of medical practice, which is an area traditionally
left to state regulation.8 2 The same express intent the Court requires
for congressional abrogation of state autonomy should apply when
the federal government threatens to interpret a law in contravention
of state regulation of an area traditionally reserved to the states.
Consequently, the lack of any clear congressional intent to abrogate
existing state regulations in the CSA precluded Ashcroft from
issuing his Directive.
This Note has already provided the reader with a survey of
relevant doctrines of federalism and case law that lends support to
the contention that a federal official should not be able to interpret
federal law in a manner that infringes on a state's power to regulate
in an arena traditionally reserved to the state. The next sections
outline the historical and legal background of Oregon's physician-
assisted suicide initiative.
A. The Death with Dignity Act
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act (also known as Measure 16)
allows a capable, terminally ill Oregon resident to obtain a
prescription for a lethal dose of medication after obtaining the
79. Id.
80. See Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatok, 501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991)
(stating that the "power to abrogate [Eleventh Amendment immunity] can only
be exercised by a clear legislative statement.").
81. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
82. See, e.g., Linder, 286 U.S. at 18 (stating that "[d]irect control of
medical practice in the States is beyond the power of the Federal
Government.")
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approval of two licensed physicians.8 3 The Act imposes significant
obligations on the physician, who must inform the patient of his
diagnosis, his prognosis, the potential risks of life-ending
medication, and alternatives "including, but not limited to, comfort
care, hospice care and pain control. 8 4  The physician must
"recommend that the patient notify next of kin ' 85 and inform the
patient of a fifteen day waiting period, during which the patient has
the opportunity to rescind the request at any time.86
Oregon voters first passed the Death with Dignity Act in 1994,
by a 51% to 49% margin.87 The next year a District Court found the
Act unconstitutional because it "provides a means to commit suicide
to a severely overinclusive class who may be competent,
incompetent, unduly influenced, or abused by others. The state
interest and the disparate treatment are not rationally related ... *,88
However, in February 1997 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the federal
courts lacked jurisdiction over the matter and vacated the District
Court's ruling.89  The Act again went before Oregon voters in
November 1997, when the state legislature gave voters the
opportunity to repeal the Act. Oregonians decisively declined to
repeal the Act and rejected the referendum by a 60% to 40%
margin. 9°
The result is that Oregon voters passed legislation that addressed
prescription medicine. This ballot initiative thus appears to have
been a valid exercise of the state 's plenary power to regulate a matter
of local concern-health and safety and, more specifically, the direct
control of medicine.
B. The Controlled Substances Act
Congress enacted the CSA as part of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.91 The legislative history
shows that Congress's purpose in enacting the CSA was to control
83. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-.995 (1999).
84. Id. § 127.815.
85. Id. § 127.815(f).
86. See id. § 127.840.
87. See supra note 72.
88. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437.
89. Lee, 107 F.3d at 1382.
90. See supra note 75.
91. See 21 U.S.C. § 801-950 (2000).
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drug use and trafficking in the United States. 92 Under the CSA, it is
unlawful for any person "to manufacture, distribute, or dispense.., a
controlled substance [except as authorized by the CSA]. 93 Congress
amended the CSA numerous times in response to growing concern
over drug trafficking and abuse of both illicit and prescription
drugs.94  In order to lawfully dispense controlled substances, a
physician must register with the DEA.95  In 1984, Congress
empowered the Attorney General to "deny an application for [DEA]
registration if he determines that the issuance of such registration
would be inconsistent with the public interest."
96
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and DEA adopted several
regulations regarding the CSA. The regulation entitled "Purpose of
issue of prescription" provides, "A prescription for a controlled
substance to be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical
purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his
professional practice .... ,97 If a doctor fills a prescription outside
the usual course of medical treatment, that doctor faces criminal
penalties.
98
To recap, Congress passed federal legislation to address an
interstate issue, and it did so pursuant to a valid exercise of its
powers under the Commerce Clause. The statute makes no mention
of any intent to supercede contrary state law because the impetus
behind the statute was interstate drug trafficking, the regulation of
which is necessarily not within a state's plenary police power.
C. The DEA and Congress Respond
The DEA and Congress were quick to respond to Oregon, yet
enjoyed little success. In November 1997, DEA Administrator
Thomas Constantine wrote Representative Henry Hyde a letter
stating that "delivering, dispensing or prescribing a controlled
substance with the intent of assisting a suicide would not be under
any current definition a 'legitimate medical purpose' [under the
92. See id. § 801(2).
93. Id. § 841(a)(1).
94. See Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d. at 1081.
95. See id. at 1081-82.
96. Id.
97. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2001).
98. Id.
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CSA]." 99 Attorney General Janet Reno rebuffed Constantine in a
June 1998 letter to Representative Hyde, where she stated, "There is
no evidence that Congress, in the CSA, intended to displace the
states as the primary regulators of the medical profession, or to
override a state's determination as to what constitutes legitimate
medical practice in the absence of a federal law prohibiting that
practice."10
0
Now that Reno had declared that the states, and not the federal
government, had the power to decide what constituted "legitimate
medical practice," opponents of physician-assisted suicide turned
their focus to Congress. The same day of Reno's pronouncement,
Representative Hyde and Senator Don Nickles introduced the Lethal
Drug Abuse Prevention Act in the House and Senate, respectively. 10
The purpose of this Bill was to "clarify Federal law to prohibit the
dispensing or distribution of a controlled substance for the purpose of
causing, or assisting in causing, the suicide, euthanasia, or mercy
killing of any individual."'0 2 The Bill stalled in the House and was
discharged in September 1998.103
In 1999, Representative Hyde and Senator Nickles' again
attempted to strike down Oregon's Act with their introduction of the
Pain Relief Promotion Act (PRPA) concurrently in the House and
Senate.10 4 The purpose of the PRPA was "[t]o amend the Controlled
Substances Act to promote pain management and palliative care
without permitting assisted suicide and euthanasia, and for other
purposes."'1 5 The Bill passed the House by a 271 to 156 margin,
10 6
but it has been mired in the Senate for two years, "in large part due to
99. Letter from Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration, to Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Judiciary
Committee, U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 5, 1997), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/constantine.htm.
100. Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice, to
Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Judiciary Committee, U.S. House of
Representatives (June 5, 1998), available at http://www.house.gov/
judiciary/attygen.htm.
101. H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 2151, 105th Cong. (1998).
102. 144 CONG. REc. S5,787 (1998) (statement of Sen. Nickles).
103. 144 CONG. REc. H8,083 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1998).
104. H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1272, 106th Cong. (1999).
105. H.R. 2260 at 1.
106. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 544, available at
http://clerkweb.house.gov/cgi-bin/vote.exe?year= 1999&rollnumber=544.
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[Oregon] Senator Ron Wyden's threat of a filibuster and his ability
to garner enough support to avoid cloiture."' 10 7 Senate Bill 1272
remains in limbo.
Because of the lack of congressional intent in the CSA to
supercede state regulation of the medical profession, Attorney
General Reno informed the DEA Administrator that the states had
the power to determine what constituted a legitimate medical
practice. Members of Congress then attempted to pass legislation
that would supercede Oregon law, but all such attempts have stalled.
D. The Supreme Court Weighs In
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court determined
that individuals do not have a fundamental right to physician-assisted
suicide. 10 8  Glucksberg had no direct impact on the Death with
Dignity Act, and the Court noted that its "holding permits this debate
to continue, as it should in a democratic society."' 0 9  Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion went slightly further, noting that
"States are presently undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of
physician-assisted suicide .... '[T]he... challenging task of
crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding... liberty interests
is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States. . . in the first
instance.'"110
Thus the Supreme Court noted that the regulation of physician
assisted suicide was a matter of state-level debate. Without a
fundamental right at issue, it is difficult to conceive of a method by
which the federal government could protect such activity, thus
necessarily leaving the issue to the states.
E. The Ashcroft Directive
It is against this backdrop that Ashcroft issued his "interpretive
rule" with regard to the CSA. Because federal legislation to override
107. Robert A. Klinck, Recent Development: Pain Relief Promotion Act, 38
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 249, 253 (2001).
108. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). The Court was
careful to distinguish any right to physician-assisted suicide from the
acknowledged fundamental right to refuse life-saving treatment in Cruzan v.
Dir., 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
109. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
110. Id. at 737 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990)).
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Oregon's Act stalled in Congress and the Supreme Court had
indicated that there was room for states to devise constitutionally
sound physician-assisted suicide statutes, only the executive branch
could attempt to forestall the Act."'
The Ashcroft Directive resulted in the exact usurpation of states'
rights that this Note contends violates principles of federalism. A
federal official, faced with a lack of legislative or judicial support,
interpreted a federal statute in a manner that directly contravened
state law. The state law at issue regulated health and safety, a matter
of state police power. The stage was thus set for a court battle.
F. The District Court Injunction
On April 17, 2002, District Court Judge Robert E. Jones issued a
permanent injunction against Ashcroft on three grounds. 1 2 First, the
plain language of the CSA did not support Ashcroft's interpretive
rule, because:
No provision of the CSA, however, alone (as defendants
urge) or viewed as a 'symmetrical and coherent scheme'
demonstrates or even suggests that Congress intended to
delegate to the Attorney General or the DEA the authority
to decide, as a matter of national policy, a question of such
magnitude as whether physician-assisted suicide constitutes
a legitimate medical purpose or practice.'
13
Judge Jones also rejected Ashcroft's argument that the
legislative history behind the CSA granted him the authority to
determine what constitutes a legitimate medical purpose. He found
that the primary purpose behind the CSA and its Amendments was to
control drug trafficking and abuse, and noted that neither side has
presented any evidence that Congress ever even considered
physician-assisted suicide in enacting or amending the CSA.
114
Finally, the Judge concluded that case law did not support Ashcroft's
111. Numerous news agencies have reported that Ashcroft acted to fulfill a
campaign promise made by President George W. Bush. See US Gov't
Challenges Oregon Assisted Suicide Law, REUTERS HEALTH, (Sept. 23, 2002),
available at http://www.deathwithdignity.org/resources/articles/
reutershealth_9-23-02.htm.
112. See Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1077.
113. Id. at 1089.
114. See id. at 1091.
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case, as each case cited in his favor involved criminal actions against
DEA registered physicians or pharmacists whose activities bore little
resemblance to "usual or accepted medical practice."''
5
Based on these findings, Judge Jones issued a permanent
injunction against Ashcroft. His opinion concluded with the
observation that "certain congressional leaders made a good faith
effort to get through the administrative door that which they could
not get through the congressional door, seeking refuge with the
newly-appointed Attorney General whose ideology matched their
views .... 16 The Court emphasized that the case turned on
statutory interpretation and that any constitutional issues were
outside the scope of the opinion." 7 It is to these constitutional issues
that this Note now turns.
IV. CONCLUSION: "You DON'T HEAR ME COMPLAINING ABOUT
OREGON'S LAW"--JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA' 18
Although perhaps outside the scope of the District Court's
holding, these Constitutional issues are necessarily within the scope
of this Note. The battle between Oregon and Ashcroft boils down to
a few facts relevant to this Note's proposal. First, the regulation in
controversy affects a matter within the states' power to regulate, not
the federal government's. Second, a federal official has based his
contravening interpretation on a federal statute that makes no
mention of invalidating state law to the contrary. 19 Finally, Oregon
voters passed the law in question twice, and it appears to mirror the
Supreme Court's holding in Glucksberg.
The fact that Measure 16 was a ballot initiative bears even more
on federalism concerns. Oregon voters placed Measure 16 on the
115. Id. The Court distinguished five cases: United States v. Moore, 423
U.S. 122 (1975); United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v,
Boettjer, 569 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Leal, 75 F.3d 219
(6th Cir. 1996).
116. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
117. See id.
118. Associated Press, Scalia Opines on Oregon Assisted Suicide Law, (Feb.
11, 2002), available at http://www.deathwithdignity.org/resources/articles/
associated_press _2-11-02.htm.
119. The District Court appears to have seen as fatal the fact that Congress
passed the CSA to address interstate illegal drug trafficking.
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ballot and decisively reaffirmed it. After four years of effect, a
federal official offered a new interpretation of a federal statute that
suddenly threatened to invalidate Oregon's law. Although ballot
initiatives are not entitled to any special Constitutional protection,
the fact that a federal official could threaten to invalidate a state-
level, voter-approved law that applies to a function that is the
exclusive prerogative of the states smacks of federal paternalism.
The Court has not been receptive to recent acts of paternalism, as
Lopez and Morrison indicate. 120
The District Court based its holding on its finding that Ashcroft
lacked the power to interpret the CSA in any manner. 12 1 But this
Note assumes that the District Court did find that Ashcroft had the
power to interpret the statute. Under the reasoning outlined in Part
II, a court should still have barred Ashcroft from interpreting the
CSA in this manner. His interpretive rule essentially blocked the
effect of Oregon's statute, a statute that deals solely with the
regulation of physician-assisted suicide. Such regulation falls within
the "direct control of medicine," which is reserved to the states under
Linder.122 Oregon's Act addresses the prescription of life-ending
medication and falls squarely within Linder's findings regarding the
"direct control of medicine."'
123
Recall Chief Justice Marshall's observation in Cohens that
"Congress has a right to punish murder in a fort, or other place
within its exclusive jurisdiction; but no general right to punish
murder committed within any of the States.' 24  Likewise, had
Congress succeeded in its attempts to criminalize physician assisted
suicide at a federal level through either the Lethal Drug Abuse
Prevention Act or the Pain Relief Promotion Act, 25 Congress still
would have faced an uphill battle when the law met a constitutional
challenge. Congress simply may not pass laws effecting a general
police power, however noble its intentions may be. States have
120. It is also hard to believe that any link to interstate commerce could save
Ashcroft's interpretation of the CSA. An analysis along "costs-of-crime" lines
would likely fail as it did in Lopez and Morrison.
121. See Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1091.
122. See Linder, 268 U.S. at 17.
123. Id.
124. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 426.
125. See supra Part III.C.
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plenary police power, while Congress has limited, enumerated
powers.
If not even Congress could have passed an act mirroring
Ashcroft's wishes, it is even more offensive to federalism that an
unelected federal official would take it upon himself to interpret a
federal regulation in contravention of state law.126 That a federal
official would offer such an interpretation in the face of a ballot
initiative that Oregon voters passed not once but twice is exactly the
sort of federal intrusion on state sovereignty that the Founding
Fathers sought to guard against.
The Court has noted that our representative political system
provides sufficient protection to states. States elect the President
through the electoral college and receive equal representation in the
Senate. Thus, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, the Court intimated that perhaps the states should turn to
the political process instead of to the Tenth Amendment for
protection.12 7 But Oregon could not turn to the political process
because Ashcroft is an executive official, unaccountable to both
Congress and to the political process. Thus, in cases where an
executive official outside the political process has interpreted a
federal law in the manner that this Note proscribes, the Tenth
Amendment provides a better vehicle for state protection than does
the political process approach of Garcia.
The only way Ashcroft could save face is if there were a
congressional mandate explaining that the CSA was drafted in an
effort to supercede state law. But Congress did not choose to do this.
Without such express congressional intent, a federal official should
not be able to take the action that Ashcroft did and expect such an
action to square with notions of federalism.
126. It is especially ironic that Ashcroft was appointed by a Republican
President, as the Republican Party has traditionally been more closely
identified with the defense of states' rights. Note that Attorney General Reno,
appointed by a Democratic President, issued the original interpretation of the
CSA, despite the common conception that the Democratic Party gives little
concern to states' rights.
127. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551-53. The court found that the notion of
"traditional" areas of local control was too ill-defined. Id. But the idea that
some areas are best left to local control is a hallmark of federalism
jurisprudence. See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
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Where a federal official interprets a law in contravention of
existing state law in an area that is traditionally reserved to the states,
there must be an express Congressional statement that gives that
official the authority to interpret the law in that manner. Absent such
express intent, an interpretation that contravenes existing state law in
such an area runs afoul of principles of federalism that preserve state
sovereignty and limited federal power. Ashcroft's interpretation of
the CSA superceded Oregon's physician-assisted suicide law in spite
of the lack of any indication that Congress intended the CSA to
govern such matters of local control. Based on the principle
proposed by this Note, federal overreaching of this nature violates
principles of federalism, and threatens the balance of power between
federal and state government.
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